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The decoherent (consistent) histories formalism has been proposed as a means of
eliminating measurements as a fundamental concept in quantum mechanics. In
this formalism, probabilities can be assigned to any description which satisfies a
particular consistency condition. The formalism, however, admits incompatible
descriptions which cannot be combined, unlike classical physics. This seems to
leave an ambiguity in the choice of the description. I argue that this ambiguity is
removed by considering the observer as a physical system.
1 Introduction
The most important problems in the interpretation of quantum mechanics—
possibly the only important problem—is the so-called measurement problem:
the inconsistency between the unitary evolution described by the Schro¨dinger
equation and the discontinuous, non-unitary evolution given by the von Neu-
mann projection postulate. In standard QM, the wavefunction of a quantum
system evolves continuously according to the Schro¨dinger equation,
d|ψ〉
dt
= − i
h¯
Hˆ|ψ〉, (1)
where Hˆ is a Hamiltonian operator and |ψ〉 the state of the system at the cur-
rent time t. When the system is measured, however, by an external measuring
device, the state jumps instantaneously to a new state
|ψ〉 → |ψk〉 = Pˆk|ψ〉/√pk (2)
with probability pk = 〈ψ|Pˆk|ψ〉, where the {Pˆk} are a complete set of orthog-
onal projection operators. The choice of projections depends on the quantity
being measured.
It is clear that these two evolution laws are quite different. Presumably
the difference arises because of the influence of the external measuring device.
But any such device must itself be made of atoms and other components which
are themselves subject to quantum laws. If we include the measuring device
together with the system as a larger, joint system, this larger system will no
longer obey the von Neumann projection rule; instead, it will evolve into a
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superposition of all possible measurement results, reminiscent of the famous
Schro¨dinger’s cat paradox.
We can attempt to go beyond this by having an observer look at the mea-
suring device; this itself might count as a measurement, which will “collapse”
the wavefunction. But the observer, too, is composed of atoms and molecules
which obey quantum laws. We seem to be caught in an infinite regress.
One proposal to get out of this regress is the “decoherence” program of
Zurek, Joos and Zeh, and others1. Any macroscopic system (like a measuring
device) must interact with many microscopic degrees of freedom in its environ-
ment: stray photons and molecules of gas which bounce off of it, the atoms in
the floor beneath, etc. These extra degrees of freedom become correlated with
the state of the macroscopic system, destroying the possibility of macroscopi-
cally distinct states interfering with each other. In essence, they continuously
perform “measurements” on all macroscopic systems with which they interact.
This is an important insight, and is unarguably a real effect: the exper-
imental evidence for decoherence is overwhelming. But as a solution for the
measurement problem it leaves many people dissatisfied. If we describe the
state of the system alone, tracing out the environment, decoherence can in-
deed explain how an initially pure state |ψ〉 can evolve into a mixed state
ρ =
∑
k
|ψk〉pk〈ψk| =
∑
k
Pˆk|ψ〉〈ψ|Pˆk, (3)
which looks like a probabilistic mixture of different measurement outcomes |ψk〉
with probabilities pk, just as in the measurement scheme described above. But
critics complain that there is still an unexplained step between getting such a
density matrix ρ and getting a single outcome |ψk〉.
Moreover, these same critics complain that even getting this density matrix
depends crucially on making the subjective distinction between system and
environment, and on tracing out the environment degrees of freedom. If we
describe the state of system and environment together, it remains pure, and
obeys Schro¨dinger’s equation at all times. What is missing is an explanation of
our subjective experience, in which a single event occurs with some probability.
In order to explain this experience, we need to have some idea of what a
probability is. Common explanations in terms of the frequencies of repeated
events are unsatisfactory; most events are not repeated exactly, and even if they
are, for a finite number of repetitions it is always possible that the observed
frequencies will be very different from those that would be predicted a priori.
A more satisfactory definition is that of the Bayesians: the probability
of an outcome is a measure of our certainty as to whether that outcome will
occur. This sounds quite subjective, but in a sense it is not. Given the same
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prior information, any two rational beings should assign the same probabilities
to the same outcomes2.
By combining this notion of subjective probabilities with a formulation of
quantum mechanics which enables a discussion of whether or not events occur,
it is possible to form an internally consistent description of quantum mechanics
without any special measurement postulate. This formulation explains both
the usual freedom of quantum mechanics to describe systems in terms of any
choice of observables, including macroscopic superpositions, and our subjective
experience in which only a single macroscopic state occurs. In the following
notes I develop this argument using the consistent histories formalism of quan-
tum mechanics3,4,5. I think any argument along these lines will arrive at a
similar conclusion (including the fact that the histories which describe our
possible experiences form a consistent set). However, I do not claim that this
is the only way in which this formalism may be consistently interpreted.
The decoherent histories formalism has been attacked as ‘ambiguous’ be-
cause it admits multiple incompatible descriptions of the same quantum system6.
I will argue in this paper that this criticism is misguided, and based on a confu-
sion between descriptions and the things they describe. We must immediately
understand two important points. First, the ‘incompatibility’ between differ-
ent descriptions in no way implies that they contradict each other, but is a
technical term indicating that they cannot be combined into a single, more
fine-grained description. This is unintuitive—in classical physics, such a com-
bination is always possible. But it is not inherently paradoxical.
Second, this ambiguity of description is a freedom we enjoy as theorists; but
it does not imply any ambiguity in the answer of unambiguous questions. Given
a particular physical system and a particular question about it, any consistent
description which addresses this question will given exactly the same answer.
In particular, we human beings are physical systems before we are theorists;
and while we may entertain many possible descriptions of the world in our
minds, we have no choice about what we actually experience.
Because I don’t wish to consider the philosophical problem of explaining
our conscious experience, which may indeed be beyond the scope of physics,
the protagonist in these notes will be a robot, equipped with a computer brain
and memory and detectors which serve as its senses. This is similar to Jaynes’s2
use of a robot to emphasize that any rational being will assign the same prob-
abilities given the same prior information.
Finally, let me clarify that ‘observers’ are in no way necessary for the
understanding of quantum mechanics. I treat the robot in this paper solely as a
model for understanding how, in principle, we might use quantum mechanics to
unambiguously predict our own subjective experience. In practice, we usually
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use quantum mechanics to describe systems without observers.
2 Consistent histories and branching wavefunctions
The formalism of consistent histories is well known, so we reprise it only briefly
here. Suppose that a closed quantum system is initially in a state |ψ0〉. It is
then possible to choose a succession of times t1 < t2 < . . . < tN , and at each
time specify an exhaustive set of alternatives at each time ti, represented math-
ematically by a set of orthogonal projections Pˆ iαi which give a decomposition
of the identity: ∑
αi
Pˆ iαi = 1ˆ, Pˆ iαiPˆ iα′i = δαiα′i . (4)
A history then consists of an alternative at each time. The history operator is
defined
Cˆα ≡ PˆNαN (tN ) · · · Pˆ1α1(t1), (5)
where Pˆ iαi(ti) is the Heisenberg operator exp[iHˆti]Pˆ iαi exp[−iHˆti].
A set of histories is consistent if it satisfies the criterion
D[α, α′] = Tr{Cˆα|ψ0〉〈ψ0|Cˆ†α′} = δαα′p(α), (6)
for all pairs of histories α and α′. If this is satisfied, then the diagonal terms
p(α) can be interpreted as the probabilities of the histories α, and these prob-
abilities satisfy the usual probability sum rule.
Such a set of histories forms a branching structure. At time t0 we know
only the initial state of the universe; at time t1 we split this into a number
of different alternatives; each of these is in turn split at time t2, and so forth.
Much has been made of this branching process, with some arguing that a
physical mechanism must exist to select one branch and discard the others.
Unfortunately, there is no single, unique consistent set of histories. Any set
which obeys the consistency criterion (6) is as valid a choice as any other. The
theory is silent on this point, a fact which has sometimes been cited as a fatal
flaw.
Actually, there is a simple way of understanding this multiplicity of consis-
tent sets in terms familiar from standard quantum mechanics, by appreciating
that specifying a consistent set of histories is the same as resolving the evolv-
ing wavefunction into orthogonal components at all times. This resolution into
components has the same branching structure as the histories: if there are n1
alternatives at time t1, n2 at t2 and so forth, then at times t < t1 there is only
one component; at t1 < t < t2 there are n1 components; at t2 < t < t3 there
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are n1n2 components, and so forth. The consistency criterion ensures that the
components are, in fact, orthogonal.
If t is between tj and tj+1 then the wavefunction can be written
|ψ(t)〉 = exp[−iHˆt]|ψ0〉
=
∑
α1,...,αj
exp[−iHˆ(t− tj)]Pˆjαj exp[−iHˆ(tj − tj−1)]Pˆj−1αj−1 · · · Pˆ1α1
× exp[−iHˆt1]|ψ0〉. (7)
Because Hamiltonian evolution preserves orthogonality, if we have chosen
a particular resolution of the wavefunction into orthogonal components we can
(if we like) select a single component, renormalize it, and follow its evolution
without having to worry about any of the others. It is this fact which enforces
obedience to the probability sum rules. Since any set of orthogonal components
can, in standard quantum mechanics, be considered eigenstates of an observ-
able, an appropriate series of measurements would pick out exactly one final
component, with a probability equal to the probability of the history. But in
consistent histories it is unnecessary (and meaningless) to invoke a measuring
device outside the system.
Thus, we see that the sort of intuitive picture often invoked in discussions
of ‘Many-Worlds,’ in which the wavefunction repeatedly branches, makes sense
when considered in the context of consistent histories. It is not clear, however,
that it makes sense to talk of these branches all being real; the reality of some-
thing with which one can never interact seems more a question for philosophy
than physics.
There is one major caveat here. There is by no means only a single way
of resolving the wavefunction into orthogonal components. Indeed, there is an
infinite number of ways, corresponding to the infinitude of consistent sets. On
the level of orthogonal components, this is little more than the statement that
many bases can be chosen for each branch.
This multiplicity of descriptions implies no physical inconsistency; we are,
in a sense, visualizing the universe from the outside, and can do so in any
way that we choose. However, that is not to say that there is no physical
significance attached to particular descriptions, or choices of set. If one wishes
to discuss, for example, the value of a particular physical variable, it only
makes sense to do so in the context of histories which assign it a value. This
should be completely obvious, but has given rise to great confusion.
Thus, there seem to be two ways of looking at consistent histories. From
the outside, it seems to be a decomposition of a unitarily evolving wavefunction
into numerous coexisting components. But in the context of a single consistent
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set, one might equally well think of it as a stochastic model in which one
history occurs with a given probability, and the others represent only potential
outcomes. I will argue in this paper that it is impossible for an observer inside a
closed ‘universe’ to distinguish between these two pictures, provided only that
we assume the weights assigned to single histories correspond to subjective
probabilities of the observer.
3 Bayesian probabilities
From the preceding discussion it is clear that probabilities, whatever they are,
must arise at the level of the branching. However, given that there are many
different consistent sets, there are many ways in which this branching could be
considered to occur. What does it mean, then, to assign probabilities to these
branches?
A good step towards answering this question is to ask what it means to
assign probabilities to alternatives in classical physics. Surprisingly, there is
still considerable controversy on this point. For years there has been an ongo-
ing debate between the frequentist and Bayesian interpretations of probability
theory. I sketch them both, briefly.
In the frequentist picture, the probability of a given result is the frequency
with which that result occurs over a large number of repeated trials. This has
a certain intuitive appeal, and lends itself well to describing some problems,
such as the odds of rolling various numbers with dice.
Unfortunately, as a rigorous basis for probabilities the frequentist descrip-
tion has serious flaws. What does it mean to say that the probability is the
frequency over many trials? How many trials? If it is a finite number, there
will always be some cases in which the frequencies deviate markedly from the
underlying probabilities. How do we deal with those cases? One can’t simply
dismiss them as improbable; probability is what we are trying to define!
A related problem is that the frequentist approach is mute in assigning
probabilities to single events. Looking at repeated trials makes sense when
betting on dice, but not when betting on horse-races or football games; no two
races or games will ever be exactly alike. But that doesn’t stop the bookmakers
from setting odds.
The Bayesian interpretation is quite different. In this picture, a proba-
bility is always subjective, in the sense that it reflects the uncertainty of a
rational agent with incomplete information. This agent need not be “intel-
ligent;” it need only be able to reason consistently according to fixed rules.
An appropriately programmed computer would be a perfectly good rational
agent. Probabilities are subjective, in that they depend on the information
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possessed by the agent, but they are objective in that any two agents given the
same information would assign exactly the same probabilities, as long as both
agents were rational.
In the Bayesian interpretation all probabilities are a result of imperfect
information, and therefore it makes as much sense to assign probabilities to
single events as to long sequences. And what is more, the correspondence
between frequencies and probabilities now becomes clear: given the probability
for a single trial, one can deduce the probabilities that different frequencies will
be observed in repeated trials (as long as these trials are independent). As the
number of trials increases, it becomes less and less probable that the frequency
will deviate significantly from the single-time probability.
In this way, frequencies remain important. From the outcome of a sin-
gle event, a rational agent has little way of assessing how good its a priori
probabilities were. By examining the outcomes of many events, however, the
agent can either gain confidence in its assessment, or else improve it in light of
experience.
This is the Bayesian picture for a classical world. It has had great success in
unifying the results of probability theory within a single, consistent framework.
But how must it be changed to deal with a fundamentally quantum world?
4 The robot
The first question to be answered is what exactly is a rational agent? A rational
agent is simply a physical system which is capable of processing information
according to definite rules: in short, a computer. Following E.T. Jaynes, we
term this agent ‘The Robot’2.
Since we imagine our robot to be something which could (at least in prin-
ciple) exist, we model it as a finite automaton. Such a device has a finite
number of possible internal states, and a finite number of possible inputs. At
each stage in its computation it receives a single input value, and based on its
current state and the value of the input it evolves deterministically to a new
state.
The robot begins with a certain amount of prior information. This is con-
tained both in its programming (i.e., the rules by which it changes states) and
its initial state. We assume that it has been programmed to reason consistently,
and is therefore rational in our limited sense.
The internal state of the robot is a valid observable, so we can choose basis
states which are eigenstates of this observable. We label these basis states |Bn〉,
where Bˆ is the observable and Bn indicates that the robot is in its nth internal
state.
7
This observable Bˆ is highly coarse-grained. The robot will undoubtedly
contain many more internal degrees of freedom which are more or less irrelevant
for our purposes. We will call these degrees of freedom the ‘environment of the
robot’ and label them b. Thus a complete state of the robot could be expressed
in a basis |Bn, b〉.
This is not sufficient to describe the functioning of the robot. It must also
receive data from the outside world. This data will, in general, be far from a
complete description of the world. Rather, we assume that the robot’s senses
are limited, so that it can only get a very coarse-grained picture. Let Aˆ be the
observable which the robot has access to. For instance, Aˆ might be the output
from a measuring device, or a group of measuring devices. We call any other
degrees of freedom which are irrelevant to the value of Aˆ ‘the environment of
A,’ and label them a. Thus, a state of the robot, its input data, and their
respective environments can be expressed in the basis |Am, a, Bn, b〉.
Finally, there may be other degrees of freedom in the universe to which
the robot has no direct access, but which do affect the dynamics of Aˆ. We will
lump these together under the label Qˆ, with eigenvalues Ql. Note that there
may be more than one reasonable choice of Qˆ; for example, if the external
system were a spin-1/2 particle one might choose to express the spin in the x
basis, the y basis, or any other direction. Picking one description Qˆ for the
present, a complete state can now be written
|ψ〉 =
∑
l,m,n
cl,m,n|Am, a, Bn, b, Ql〉. (8)
We will usually suppress the environment labels a, b. They can be important,
however, in that they allow the dynamics of A and B to be irreversible and
decoherent.
In describing the dynamics of the robot and its world, we let time be
discrete, each time corresponding to a single tick of the robot’s internal clock.
At each step, the robot will change from its current state to one of N possible
successor states, depending on which if its N possible values the observable Aˆ
assumes. The state of the robot after j steps then depends on its initial value
and the succession of values Ai that it observes:
B(tj) = B(B(tj−1), Aj−1) = B(B0, A0, A1, . . . , Aj−1). (9)
We assume that the robot starts in a special initial state, ready to solve a
problem. Note that this dependence on all previous values of Ai means that the
robot “remembers” what values of Aˆ it has already seen. Aˆ will generally have
dynamics of its own, which for the moment we will assume are independent of
8
Bˆ. (Later we will allow the robot to act on the information it acquires.) In a
single time step Am goes to some new value Am+1.
The quantum dynamics is almost exactly the same. Neglecting, for the
moment, the existence of any significant variables Qˆ, evolution in time is given
by a unitary operator Uˆ which effects
Uˆ |ψ〉 = Uˆ
(∑
m,n
cm,n|Am, Bn〉
)
=
∑
m,n
cm,nUˆ |Am, Bn〉
=
∑
m,n
cm,n|Am+1, B(Bn, Am)〉. (10)
To be truly consistent, we should include the environment degrees of freedom
as well:
Uˆ |Am, a, Bn, b〉 = |Am+1, a′(Am), B(Bn, Am), b′(Bn)〉. (11)
5 Histories of the robot
We are now in a position to ask what our robot ‘sees’ in a given situation. The
obvious way to do this is to choose for our alternatives projections onto the
internal state of the robot PˆBn .
Note that we need not project onto the internal state of the robot alone.
We can, if we like, project onto the values of the observable Aˆ as well, or even
include portions of the environments a and b and possible Qˆ as well, provided
that consistency is not violated. The possible experiences of the robot do not
pick out a unique consistent sets, but rather a large family of such sets, each
a fine-graining of the coarsest description which includes projections on the
internal state of the robot and nothing else. Some of these fine-grainings may
be incompatible with each other, but they are all compatible with this coarsest
set. The important point is that histories incompatible with the observable Bˆ
tell us nothing about what the robot ‘sees’ and ‘thinks.’
Because Aˆ and Bˆ are perfectly correlated, histories of Aˆ, Bˆ, and Aˆ and Bˆ
will all have the same probabilities. Thus, it doesn’t matter whether we take
the worm’s-eye-view inside the robot’s brain, or the ‘objective’ picture of what
it considers is going on in the world outside. The predictions in either case are
the same.
This, by the way, is a good place to point out that this robot is not intended
to fill a role similar to that filled by ‘The Observer’ in standard quantum
mechanics. There is no mystical significance to the presence of a rational agent.
It is simply another physical system, and obeys exactly the same laws as any
other physical system. I will say more about invoking imaginary ‘Observers’
in a later section.
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6 Predicting the outcome of an experiment
Suppose that the robot is programmed to be a gambling machine, betting on
the outcome of a quantum measurement. The initial state is
|ψ〉 = |A0, B0〉 ⊗ (α|Q1〉+ β|Q2〉). (12)
The external system is in a superposition of two eigenstates Q1 and Q2 of some
observable Qˆ; for instance, it might be a spin-1/2 particle.
The robot has the following initial information: (1) it knows the rules of
quantum mechanics, (2) it knows the initial state of the external system, and
(3) it has been offered some odds O on the outcome of a measurement of Qˆ.
The variable Aˆ gives the position of the pointer on a measuring device.
The robot must decide whether or not the odds it has been offered are
fair. If they are, it will bet $1 on the outcome Q1; if not, it will bet nothing.
If the outcome is Q1, the robot wins $O. If it is Q2, it loses a dollar. The
robot’s expected winnings are O|α|2 − |β|2. Rationally, the robot should only
accept the bet if |β|2/|α|2 ≤ O. With this strategy, it can never lose money
on average.
In another way of looking at this, however, it seems like the robot always
both wins and loses. After all, if we think of a set of histories as a branch-
ing wavefunction, after the measurement both components are present with
probability 1. The evolution is, in fact, completely deterministic.
This is where it is important to bear in mind that the probabilities that
matter to the robot are subjective probabilities. A mythical ‘outside observer’
might see both outcomes; but there is no such observer. The only observers
are inside the system, and an observer in a given branch can only see the events
within that branch. The winning and losing robots can never interact or be
aware of each other in any way.
An analogy due to Simon Saunders is helpful in thinking about this7. (In-
terestingly enough, almost exactly the same idea was used by two science fiction
authors, Frederick Pohl and Jack Williamson, in a pair of novels they wrote
together8.) Suppose that we have a (classical) perfect copying machine. Any
object placed in it is exactly duplicated, without itself being changed in any
way.
Suppose the technicians approach our robot, which we will call A, and ask
it to allow them to duplicate it. They assure the robot that it will notice noth-
ing at all. The robot agrees, enters the copying machine, and instantaneously a
new robot is produced, called B. Suppose that B appears on a distant planet,
so that B and A can never compare notes. Just as the technicians said, A
doesn’t feel a thing, and goes on its merry way.
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B’s experience, however, is quite different. It, too, remembers being as-
sured by the technicians that it would feel nothing; but despite their assurances
it now finds itself on a distant planet. To B, the device seems less like a copy
machine, and more like an instant transportation device. If once again asked
to be duplicated, B will undoubtedly think of things quite differently. In-
stead of walking in and walking out unchanged, it will have a 50/50 subjective
probability of remaining behind or being transported.
The situation of the robot in a quantum universe is quite similar. The
wave function may branch into a superposition of many robots making different
observations, but each one perceives only its own branch. Thus, in making a
decision before the branch occurs, the robot should rationally try to maximize
the benefits of all the copies. This is exactly the same as estimating the
subjective probabilities of each branch.
Only one requirement is necessary for this identification to be complete:
that the ‘weights’ of the different branches equal the subjective probabilities of
rational agents in those branches. This could be considered an axiom of con-
sistent histories, but in fact it may follow directly from the deeper structure of
quantum theory. Gleason’s theorem seems to argue that such an identification
is essentially inevitable.
7 Estimating the wavefunction—quantum coin tossing
This situation is parallel to the above case, but differs in important respects.
Suppose now that the external degrees of freedom consist of N identical two-
level systems in exactly the same initial state, and that these will be measured
successively by the measuring device with output value Aˆ. This time the
robot knows the rules of quantum mechanics and it knows that all the external
systems are in the same state, but does not know what that state is. Its task
is to estimate the initial state from the results of N measurements.
Suppose the initial state is
|Ψ0〉 = |A0, B0〉 ⊗
(
α|Q1〉+ β|Q2〉
)⊗ · · · ⊗ (α|Q1〉+ β|Q2〉), (13)
that is, there are prepared N identical copies of the microscopic system, each
in the same initial state, the output of the measuring device is in its initial
(null) state, and the robot is in the starting state. At each subsequent time,
the measuring device measures one of the microscopic systems and produces
an output |A1〉 or |A2〉; the robot, in turn, observes the output, and undergoes
a transition to a new state. This state depends on all of the observations up to
that time, and includes an estimate of the microscopic state with an attached
confidence limit. We can label the internal state of the robot |Bi1i2...in〉 after
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n time steps, with each of the i1 . . . in being either 1 or 2. Thus, after n steps
the state of the whole system is
|Ψn〉 =
( ∑
i1...in
αn1βn−n1 |Ain , Bi1...in〉 ⊗ |Qi1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |Qin〉
)
⊗(α|Q1〉+ β|Q2〉)⊗ · · · ⊗ (α|Q1〉+ β|Q2〉). (14)
where n1 is the number of i1 . . . in equal to 1, and N − n of the microscopic
systems remain in the initial state.
Clearly projections onto the state of Aˆ at each time form a consistent set
of histories, as do projections on Bˆ, or Aˆ and Bˆ. There will clearly be certain
histories in which the robot gets a very distorted estimate of the initial state.
For instance, in the history where the robot measures Q1 every time, it will
conclude with high confidence that the state is very close to |α| = 1. But if
|α| < 1, the probability of this happening is only |α|2N . In most histories, the
robot gets a reasonably accurate picture.
The scheme as described actually only lets the robot estimate the values of
|α|2 and |β|2, without their relative phase. In a more sophisticated experiment,
the robot might have access to three measuring devices, measuring the x, y, and
z axes, and would use 1/3 of the prepared systems in each detector; or might
even allocate systems to different detectors based on its current estimates of
its uncertainty. But the essential situation is unchanged.
8 Quantum vs. classical uncertainties
The two cases described above typify the difference between quantum and
classical probabilities. In the first case, the robot had total knowledge of the
initial state. Its uncertainty was completely due to the inherent indeterminism
of quantum systems. In the second case, its uncertainties were due to its
imperfect information, and hence were essentially classical in nature.
This illustrates the remarkable characteristic of quantum probabilities:
even maximal information in incomplete, in the sense that it does not allow the
robot to predict the outcome with certainty. Consider the following two exper-
iments. In the first, each of the N microscopic systems is prepared in the same
state α|Q1〉+β|Q2〉. In the second, |α|2N of the systems are prepared in state
|Q1〉 while |β|2N of the systems are prepared in state |Q2〉, distributed ran-
domly. If only allowed to measure Q1 vs. Q2 the robot is unable to distinguish
these two situations, but given the freedom to measure any linear combina-
tion of the two it can quickly tell them apart. Indeed, if the robot chooses to
measure the α|Q1〉 + β|Q2〉 axis, in the first case it will always get the same
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result. For this particular experiment, maximal information translates into a
deterministic outcome. But in general it does not.
Within the context of the lab, the robot has considerable freedom of choice
as to how it will prepare and measure microscopic systems. But in the world
as a whole it does not, and there is no guarantee that the variables with which
its senses are correlated will correspond to the exact state of the universe.
Therefore, in general, the robot will perceive a probabilistic universe, with
unavoidable uncertainties.
Given this fact, an interesting question becomes not why is there so much
apparent randomness in the universe, but why is there so little? Why do
deterministic classical laws hold with such good precision on the macroscopic
level? The answer to this question is still not fully understood. But it seems
clear from our experience that certain variables (highly coarse-grained ones,
for the most part) are much more predictable than others; and therefore, a
well-informed and programmed robot can make much better judgments about
their behavior than it could about general quantum variables. It is this fact,
indeed, that underlies the assumption that the robot itself can be described in
quasiclassical terms. We will briefly examine this question below.
9 Discovering quantum theory
We have, up to this point, assumed that the robot’s programming included a
knowledge of the laws of quantum mechanics. But suppose we wished for the
robot to discover those laws in the first place. How might it set about the
task?
Of course, characterizing the entire process of scientific research and dis-
covery is far beyond our abilities; the real discovery of quantum mechanics was
the result of many people working on many different problems. But we can
consider a ‘baby’ version of this problem. Suppose, once again, the robot is
provided with N microscopic systems, and the robot must decide between two
physical pictures. Either the state is a ray in a two-dimensional Hilbert space
α|Q1〉 + β|Q2〉, or it is a classical spin pointing in a random direction, with
definite probabilities px, py, and pz of the having positive spin components Sx,
Sy, and Sz . The robot can measure spins along either the x or z directions,
and can perform repeated measurements on the same spin.
One can sketch out the form of an experiment. Both pictures give identical
predictions for single spin measurements x or z, or pairs of spin measurements
xx, zz, xz or zx. Their predictions differ, however, for three measurements
xzx or zxz. In the classical picture, the first and last measurements should
always give identical results, while in the quantum picture they should not.
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We now let the robot go, and it performs its N measurements. In the
vast majority of cases, it will correctly conclude that the quantum description
is better than the classical. There is a chance, however, of 1/2N that the
experimental outcome will exactly match the classical prediction. In that case,
the robot will conclude, based on its available information, that the classical
description is much more likely than the quantum.
In any probabilistic theory there is always a possibility that, purely by
chance, one may reach the wrong conclusion from a correct experiment. In
medical testing, where small samples are the rule, this in fact happens all the
time. In physics, we rarely spend much time worrying about the possibility.
After all, the probability of it occurring is almost unimaginably small for a
typical experiment. But in enumerating all possible histories, there will always
be some, of low probability, in which highly atypical things happen. It should
be clearly understood that the existence of such possible histories in no way
violates either the laws of physics or of common sense.
10 Robots as canonical observers
I have argued, I hope convincingly, that quantum mechanics (and decoher-
ent histories in particular) can describe the experiences of observers without
ambiguity. However, an extreme subjectivist might now charge that we have
undermined the ability of quantum mechanics to describe a system without
observers. The formalism can easily be applied to such systems, to calculate a
consistent set of histories with appropriate probabilities. But if we insist that
probabilities are meaningful only as the subjective judgments of a rational
agent, what do the probabilities mean if there are no rational agents around?
Do they mean anything at all?
Probably very few people, if any, would take such an extreme view. It is
the probabilistic equivalent of asserting that a tree falling in a forest with no
one around not only makes no sound, but doesn’t even exist. However, even
without going to such an extreme, one might still ask for an interpretation of
the probabilities we calculate.
One way of answering this question is to invoke an imaginary ‘canonical
observer,’ who passively observes which set of events occurs, and whose sub-
jective probabilities would match those of the particular consistent set we are
using. An important property of consistent sets is that it is always possible,
in principle, to add such an observer to the system without altering the pre-
dicted probabilities of the different histories. Indeed, it is possible to derive
the consistency criterion from this requirement. Such an observer would be
similar to the canonical observers, each equipped with a clock and meter stick,
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which are often invoked in General Relativity to explain the meaning of the
metric. These relativistic observers are assumed to be too small to distort
the solution of Einstein’s equations. Similarly, the quantum observers avoid
interfering with the probabilities by restricting themselves to consistent sets.
The ‘canonical observers’ could be one or more of our robots, carefully
tailored to the particular decoherent set we are using. But the most important
thing to remember is that these are imaginary observers. We do not insist
when doing a calculation in General Relativity that it only makes sense if
space is filled with tiny people carrying clocks and meter sticks. Similarly,
in quantum mechanics it is perfectly sensible to create descriptions in which
nothing resembling a measurement or an observer is present.
11 Why quasiclassical variables? The parable of the hourglass
Quasiclassical variables are the familiar variables of the classical world: coarse-
grained center of mass positions and momenta of macroscopic objects, averaged
field strengths in small cells in space, and so forth. These are the variables
which most simply describe us as physical systems, as well as what we observe
in the world around us.
The question is, why should this be so? Within decoherent histories there
are an infinity of consistent sets, corresponding to an infinity of possible de-
scriptions, almost none of which are anything like quasiclassical. What is
it about the quasiclassical description which is special? Or is there nothing
special about it at all, and we could have evolved to use a very different de-
composition of the wavefunction?
While the answer to this question is not known, it has been speculated that
what makes the quasiclassical description is its predictability. Quasiclassical
variables give a highly coarse-grained description which approximately obeys
a closed set of deterministic equations. Highly nonclassical descriptions, such
as descriptions in terms of macroscopic superpositions, do not.
The most famous example of a macroscopic superposition is Schro¨dinger’s
cat. Sealed in a box with a vial of poison, whose release is controlled by the
decay of a single atom, the cat evolves into an equally-weighted superposition
of being alive and dead:
|ψ〉 = |live, undecayed〉 → |ψ′〉 = 1√
2
(|live, undecayed〉+ |dead, decayed〉) .
(15)
If we describe this system in the decoherence formalism, we could choose a
set which includes projectors |ψ〉〈ψ| and |ψ′〉〈ψ′| at the initial and final times.
Such a description is highly nonclassical, but obviously consistent (since |ψ′〉 is
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just the unitarily evolved successor to |ψ〉). Or we could choose a quasiclassical
description, with projectors Pˆlive, Pˆdead at both the initial and final times. Why
should we choose one rather than the other?
One observation which we should make is that live vs. dead is a very
coarse-grained trait. The projectors Pˆlive and Pˆdead correspond to very large
subspaces of the Hilbert space of the cat. The quasiclassical description is thus
robust under perturbations of the initial state, the dynamics, and the times of
the projections. The unitary description is not.
The time evolution of the quasiclassical description is also far simpler. In
the case of Schro¨dinger’s cat, it begins by being alive; if we wait long enough
(and the humane society doesn’t intervene) the cat will become dead, and
remain dead thereafter. The description in terms of macroscopic superposi-
tions, by contrast, will change constantly and rapidly, exhibiting extremely
complicated dynamics.
The physics of live and dead cats is a bit too complicated for easy analysis,
but the essential point can be captured by a classical analogy. Consider an
hourglass, which begins with all the sand in the upper half. After approxi-
mately an hour, all the sand will have dropped to the lower half. We could
try to describe this system by keeping track of the position, velocity and ori-
entation of every grain of sand, but this is far too complicated to carry out in
practice. Instead, we might consider some kind of coarse-grained description
of the hourglass.
Here are two such coarse-grainings, which are superficially similar.
f(t) =
{
1 if more sand on top at time t;
0 otherwise.
g(t) =
{
1 if odd number of grains on top at time t;
0 otherwise.
. (16)
Both variables are defined at all times, and give exactly one bit of information
about the state of the hourglass. But f(t) gives a simple description with a
simple time-evolution, which is robust under perturbations of the initial state;
the exact time of the transition from 1 to 0 may vary slightly, but the essentials
of the description are unchanged. By contrast, g(t) exhibits very complicated
behavior, which evolves unpredictably on a much shorter timescale than f(t),
and which is highly sensitive to the exact initial state of the sand. Which
description is simpler and more stable? Which is more useful? It is not hard to
see that quasiclassical histories are more like f(t), and histories of macroscopic
superpositions are more like g(t).
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